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Capturing the Flag: The Struggle for National Identity in Nonviolent Revolutions
Abstract
One goal of nonviolent resistance movements is to legitimize themselves in opposition to governments
by undermining the latter’s leadership. We argue nonviolent groups that can ‘own’ the national identity are
more likely to succeed, as they can assert the legitimacy of their vision for the state, and persuade other
sectors of society to support their cause. Our argument is supported by the Arab Spring uprisings, where
those resistance movements that were able to identify and claim ownership over a homogeneous
national identity were more successful in pressing their claims. We view national identity as a component
of symbolic power in both successful and unsuccessful nonviolent revolutions. We supplement our
argument via a comparison of the Arab Spring uprisings featuring Egypt, Bahrain, and Libya, with
nonviolent movements of the past: the ‘early’ cases (Northern Ireland, Iran, and the Philippines) and the
color revolutions (Serbia, Georgia, and the Ukraine). We posit that the role of national identity, while not a
determinant of success, can play an important role in the struggle for legitimacy, which may help
determine the prospects of success for these movements.
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Why are some nonviolent revolutions more successful than others in ousting the
incumbent? According to traditional theories of nonviolence, largely stemming from the works
of Gene Sharp (1973), much of the problem stems from a failure of agency on the part of the
insurgent group. This failure can come from a lack of organization, an inability to connect with
and undermine the incumbent’s pillars of support, or a failure to reach out to the wider
population. In contrast to this view on agency, Lucan Way (2008, 2010) argued structural
elements, namely the availability of national identity, are crucial for the success of nonviolent
movements. Put differently, if the national identity is commonly shared by both elites and
masses, and can be framed in anti-incumbent terms, the nonviolent movement is more likely to
prevail.
By concentrating on national identity as a key variable, we seek to understand the tension
between the structural and agency-driven views. Is the national identity in question involved in
the nonviolent conflict, and to what extent has it been captured by insurgent or incumbent
parties? Answering this question allows us to chart a conceptual path that improves our
understanding of structural and agency-driven elements that can increase (or reduce) the
likelihood of success of nonviolent movements. In essence, we seek a middle path. This paper
illustrates that the structural condition of having or building a national identity is generally linked
to the success or failure of a nonviolent movement. To a lesser extent, we also argue there is a
need for nonviolent agency to actively contest the legitimacy associated with said national
identity.
Traditional Views of Nonviolence and Success: Agency and Organization
Nonviolence is largely viewed as a methodology of agency, or a series of strategies and
tactics that allow organized groups to challenge oppressive systems and overthrow dictatorships.
Nonviolence has been practiced throughout written history, though before the 19th Century it
was largely confined to spiritual traditions of both eastern and western religions and religious
movements (Nepstad, 2015).
Nonviolence has become accepted as a popular form of resistance against repressive
regimes. There were hundreds of major nonviolent campaigns in the 20th Century that attempted

to overthrow dictatorships (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). With time, nonviolent campaigns have
become more organized and strategic, making them more likely to succeed in comparison to
violent, and often opportunistic, armed insurrections (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Stephan &
Chenoweth, 2008). The growing popularity of nonviolent resistance was mirrored in the recent
proliferation of scholarship (Coy, 2013). Not every nonviolent attempt has been successful in
overthrowing the repressive incumbents. However, nonviolent movements, especially the
successful ones, continue to provide relevant lessons and inspiration for future campaigns, as
shown by the diffusion of color revolutions (Bunce & Wolchik, 2012; Nikolayenko, 2012), and
the Arab Spring uprisings (Anderson, 2011; Nepstad, 2013, 2015).
Like peace and conflict studies, nonviolence is associated with the goals of social justice
and transformation. Research, scholarship, and especially advocacy on peace and conflict studies
have focused on the role of nonviolent movements in overcoming adverse structural
considerations. Three well-known experts on nonviolence argued structural concerns have little
impact on the success or failure of nonviolent campaigns (Zunes, Merriman, & Stephan, 2010).
In this paradigm, the success of nonviolent campaigns hinges on the organization of the
campaign, and its ability to encourage elite defections and garner external support, as opposed to
initial structural conditions.
What could be described as the “agency” paradigm of strategic nonviolence is
characterized by a scholarship examining individual case studies, experiential lessons from
activists and trainers worldwide, and relevant opportunities for financial and other resources.
Writers such as Nepstad (2011, 2013, 2015), Stephan and Chenoweth (Chenoweth & Stephan,
2011; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), and Zunes (1997, 1999, 2011) focused on increasing the
ability of nonviolent groups to overcome “structural” obstacles via improved strategies and
tactics. These actions are designed to improve the organizing capabilities of civil resistance
movements, to increase the number of participants in nonviolent actions, and to reach out to
other sectors of society, i.e. to “fractionate” the regime and separate its leaders from their pillars
of support. Recent works by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Nepstad (2015) argued that one
of the key elements for successful civil resistance movements is their ability to persuade
members of the security forces—either the police, the military, or both—to either defect from the
regime or to, at the very least, step aside and refuse to implement regime orders that crack down
on civilian protesters.
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While the work of these scholars was detailed and thorough, we find the notion that any
nonviolent movement can achieve success simply through better organizing, irrespective of
circumstances, to be somewhat unconvincing. In contrasting the Sharpian and Gandhian visions
of nonviolence, Chabot and Sharifi argued that simply focusing on short-term resistance, at the
expense of long-term structural and cultural transformation, is likely to result in regime change
rather than revolution (Chabot & Sharifi, 2013, p. 22). We do believe there is value in focusing
on human agency, but we fear that if our research indicates that agency is all that matters, it may
lead activists to engage in provocative resistance activities before addressing and attempting to
change structural constraints, which may make success much harder.
The Other “Way”: Structural Factors
In sharp contrast to the literature on nonviolence, scholarships on social movements,
nationalism, and ethnic conflict tend to focus on structural factors in understanding the success
of revolutionary movements—whether violent or nonviolent. In a marked shift from nonviolent
agency, Way (2008) argued the success or failure of revolutions in former Soviet regimes
stemmed from the strength of the autocratic regime and the perceived distance from the Western
influence (p. 60). In Way’s view, the diffusion of tactics and strategies from earlier, more
successful movements had a limited impact on the ability of later movements in overthrowing
their respective dictatorships.
It is important to note that there were several skeptics of Way’s focus on a narrow range
of structural causes for the color revolutions. Foremost were Bunce and Wolchik (2009), who
countered that while structural causes are important, they must take their places alongside
equally-important issues of agency and process (p. 70). In contrast to Way, they argued that
political organization mattered, and that “what lay between structural factors and electoral
change…was a specific set of strategies…that was fashioned, applied, and transferred by a
transnational network of…democratic activists” (Bunce & Wolchik, 2009, p. 72). Likewise,
Beissinger (2009) castigated Way for downplaying the effects of diffusion; without the
transnational agency inspired by earlier revolutions—and the techniques spread by its activists—
it would be impossible to predict, as Way did, whether these revolutions would have taken place
at all. Apart from Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution, each of these movements was highly
organized, focused on nonviolent action, and inspired mass participation. Their leading
organizations played a key role in removing authoritarian incumbents from power (Beissinger,
3

2009, p. 75). A third critic, Stilitski charted a middle path, noting that while diffusion and agency
played a large part at the beginning of the color revolutions, mass participation dwindled with
time. This led him to argue some contests were “determined more by structural factors than were
others” (Silitski, 2009, pp. 87-88).
Although Way conceded there was evidence diffusion had taken place and agency played
some role, he argued the impact of diffusion in the failure of post-communist authoritarian
governments was weaker than others had argued (Way, 2009, pp. 90-91). While focusing on the
structural weaknesses of these incumbents as critically important, Way admitted that such
weaknesses did not make their falls inevitable. Instead he pointed to proximate factors, such as
incumbent popularity, which he saw as a structural factor linked to the strength or weakness of
the regime itself (Way, 2009, pp. 93-94). Way further expanded on this notion in a 2010 chapter
examining the differences between Ukraine’s successful Orange Revolution and similar yet
unsuccessful attempts to overthrow autocratic rulers in neighboring Belarus. Here, Way
discussed the role of national identity as being either securely controlled by the authoritarian
regime or as being divided and available “as a mobilizational weapon” against the incumbent
regime (Way, 2010, p. 130).
Way viewed national identity as a background or a contextual factor “arguing that
potentially successful movements require the existence of a national identity that is shared by a
majority of both elites and the general population” (Hancock, 2014b, p. 503). In such
circumstances, popular attitudes can create an “anti-incumbent majority identity” even in the
absence of a civil society, only if the incumbent is weak enough (p. 503). On the other hand, a
pro-incumbent central identity will favor the regime, providing it with both state resources and
popular mobilization (Way, 2010, p. 130).
Way viewed national identity as a structural condition that can benefit the regime or
opposition, while ignoring the possible agency of the actors. National identity, therefore, is
restricted to a dichotomous categorization, sliding away from the socially constructed nature of
identity. In response to events and framing by relevant stakeholders, collective identity can shift
in meaning and interpretation. Identities are recursive in nonviolent campaigns, crystallized
through interaction with opponents, allies, and even the public (Smithey, 2013, p. 31). In sum,
“identity can be both a structural impediment and a resource that can be redefined and put into
the service of the non-violent movement” (Hancock, 2014b, p. 504).
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Considering Way’s limited view of identity, combined with critiques of his purely
structural approach in examining the success of nonviolent movements, we propose a third way,
integrating some of the structural characteristics and the need for agency to exploit the structural
situation. With an eye toward examining national identity as both a structural characteristic and a
tool of agency, we turn our attention to our main argument.
A Third Way: Structure and Agency in Identity Capture
The struggle between incumbent regimes and nonviolent movement can be characterized
as a David and Goliath battle. The regime is Goliath. In addition to the state’s wealth, it has the
control of security forces and the obedience of the general population (Sharp, 1980, p. 23, cited
in Hancock, 2014b, p. 504). On the other hand, every nonviolent attempt starts out as David. Its
task ahead is herculean: to fight the regime successfully, it must neutralize the regime’s source of
power that often includes common belief systems or ideologies (Sharp, 1973, p. 10, cited in
Hancock 2014b, p. 504), and, in our view, national identity. History has shown that regimes have
used national identity to criticize nonviolent movements, a move that has often backfired, as
evidenced in the cases of Serbia and Georgia (Nikolayenko, 2012). To persuade most of the
population of its legitimate grievances and that they are true representatives of the people, “a
unifying national identity … or some form of bridge between communal identities needs to be
constructed” (Hancock, 2014b, p. 504). When the national identity is contested, nonviolent
movements have the opportunity to sever the regime’s power and make a credible case for their
movement’s own success.
A crucial finding of recent works on nonviolence is that in order to be successful,
nonviolent movements need to secure sufficient defections from security forces (Chenoweth &
Stephan, 2011, p. 193; Nepstad, 2011, pp. 14-15). What is meant by sufficient is difficult to say,
but it is worthwhile to point out sheer numbers might be enough in some cases, while small
numbers of high-level representatives might be sufficient in others. Chenoweth, Stephan, and
Nepstad pointed out that in the Philippines, the people power movement was able to capitalize on
the defection of two high ranking members of President Marcos’ cabinet. Alternatively, Serbia’s
Otpor movement appeared to successfully gain respect from enough members of the police and
national army, and the latter simply refused to obey the regime’s orders to stop demonstrators,
strikers, and the like during the October 2000 uprising (Erlangera, 2000).
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A basic question that has been asked, but not yet sufficiently answered, is how the split
between an incumbent ruler and his (or her) security forces is achieved. The argument of this
paper is that security force defections can only be achieved if civil resistance organizations can
convince security force members (and at times, leaders) they—and not the incumbent—are the
legitimate representatives of the country’s sovereignty. To do so, we argue there needs to be a
cohesive enough national identity in existence to be contested over by popular resistance
movements and the incumbent. Furthermore, this structural factor needs to be acted upon, i.e.,
the organized civil resistance movements need to make the case they are the legitimate
representatives of the national identity to those who make up the pillars of support for the
incumbent regime.
Like Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), we recognize the encompassing power that mass
mobilization has on many sectors of society. It allows nonviolent movements to persuasively
argue they, and not the incumbent, are the legitimate representatives of the national identity, and
thus deserve the support of state security forces. In this sense, we disagree with Way’s
contention that an existing anti-incumbent national identity is enough to engender the collapse of
an authoritarian regime.
Moving ahead, we will divide our analysis into the structural portion of the argument and
the agency portion of the argument. We shall first review several nonviolent revolutions to
examine to what extent a cohesive national identity existed that could be contested by a civil
resistance movement. We will then examine applicable cases to determine if the civil resistance
organizations contested the national identity, and if their actions had any effect upon security
force defections.
A Sense of National Identity
We will begin by examining the cases covered by Chenoweth and Stephan, as well as by
Nepstad, but will expand beyond those to look at the more recent events associated with the Arab
Spring uprisings. We will restrict our analysis to nonviolent resistance movements focused on
changing their own governments rather than on ousting an external occupier. We shall focus on
this distinction because identity as a concept is based upon an internal/external dialectic wherein
any identity—from personal to national—is always built on the opposition of self and other
(Hancock, 2010). What this means for our analysis is that there would be a clear differentiation
between movements seeking to oust “outsiders” as with Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution and
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Gandhi’s campaign to drive the British from India, and movements seeking to change internal
leadership or systems, like Serbia’s removal of Slobodan Milošević or Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak.
For the former the use or creation of a national identity would be much easier, even if temporary,
due to the ability of different groups to come together against outsiders. We will examine some
initial cases from three different time periods: an early period from 1967 through the end of the
Cold War; the period of the color revolutions from 1999 through 2009; and the more recent cases
from the Arab Spring movement.
Early Cases
In this early time period, we shall focus on national identity in a number of countries that
experienced nonviolent revolutions between 1966 and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. In
selecting our cases we have relied upon prior work done by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) as
well as by Nepstad (2011, 2013, 2015), as the most recent and comprehensive texts on the
subject.
The Northern Irish Civil Rights Association (NICRA) began their work in the mid-1960s
as an attempt to address the concerns of impoverished communities within the province
(Hancock, 2014b; NICRA, 1978; Purdie, 1990). However, rather than being seen as a classbased challenge to the wealth and privilege then currently held by upper class unionists, the
peaceful demonstrations, marches, and sit-ins (occupying rental properties) were viewed as a
sectarian attempt to create a united Ireland, attracting condemnation from both middle-class
unionists and working-class loyalists. Marches by NICRA were attacked by the latter, elements
of the police forces, and later, extreme loyalist followers of the Rev. Ian Paisley. Although
NICRA attempted to attract Protestants to its ranks, the lack of a central Northern Irish identity,
coupled with the division of that society across all sectors, meant that if Protestants were to join
the civil rights movement, they would be viewed as betraying their own community (Hancock,
2014b). This division in identity was further exposed by the Northern Irish government’s action
of granting reforms, only to implement them at a slow pace (Maney, 2012).
Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution is cited by Chenoweth and Stephan as “an example of a
successful nonviolent campaign” that pulled participants from a wide variety of social sectors,
and managed to reduce their perceived threat to Iranian security forces by maintaining a fairly
strict code of nonviolence (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 116). The Iranian campaign,
however, was sandwiched between violent periods. Armed insurrections prior to the revolution
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were largely quashed by the Shah’s regime; also, violence against leftist groups and ethnic and
religious minorities picked up after the ouster of the Shah (Sazegara & Stephan, 2010, pp. 199200). The multi-sector discipline and strategic disobedience displayed during the revolution,
therefore, is somewhat marred by the violence that followed the revolution—to include the
Iranian hostage crisis, as well as the war with Iraq. In terms of identity, it is worth noting that
Iranian society draws upon two equally rich traditions in Shia Islam and its ancient Persian past.
As Ahmadi (2005) contended, Iranian national identity and unity stem from a unique historical
confluence of characteristics that have allowed diverse elements of society to view themselves as
part of the Iranian project. These include an Iranian political heritage made up of the institution
of the state, a rich cultural and linguistic heritage, and the “omnipresent” influence of religion (p.
134). This confluence was certainly present in Iran in the period leading up to the 1979 Islamic
Revolution.
The Philippines’ 1983 People Power Revolution is cited by many as a prime example of
the power of nonviolence to triumph over an authoritarian regime. However, given the large
number of languages spoken on the islands, it is evident that national identity was consciously
constructed by the state in an attempt to unify the disparate elements of the Philippine society.
Following its independence from the U.S. in 1946, the government created the term “Filipino”
and declared the Tagalog-derived Filipino language to be the national language (Dawe, 2014, p.
70). State efforts to assemble a unified national identity have been contentious and controversial,
often marginalizing ethnolinguistic and religious groups, such as the non-Christians and the
Indigenous community (San Juan, Jr., 1999). Regardless of this apparent disunity among
religious, ethnic and linguistic groups, there is some rationale for arguing that there was enough
of a central, coherent identity available for contestation at the time of the People Power
revolution. Dolan (1993) noted that in the 1990s Philippine society was relatively homogenous,
with approximately 90 percent of the population sharing a common cultural and religious
background. This cultural and religious background helped the Roman Catholic Church play a
prominent role in the People Power movement, contributing to the unity of the movement and
inspiring massive local participation (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 120-121).
The Color Revolutions
The first of the color revolutions covered here is the Otpor—or bulldozer—Revolution in
Serbia, beginning in 1999 and culminating in October 2000. We have included Otpor in our
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analysis as it was one of the first major nonviolent revolutions following the fall of the Soviet
Union and many Eastern European communist regimes. A second reason is the ubiquitous use of
the color black in Otpor’s “clenched fist” logo. Nepstad (2015) categorized color revolutions as
electoral revolutions, due to the movements’ strategic emphasis on national elections to remove
the respective autocrats (p. 80).
Serbs are the dominant ethnic group in Serbia (The World Factbook, 2017), and it is quite
clear from history that Serbia boasts a unified and recognizable national identity. This is true of
Serbia dating back to Prince Lazar and the Battle of Kosovo Polje, as well as during the
resurgence of ethnic chauvinism and nationalism following the death of Tito in 1980. In the
context of the post-Tito environment, Milošević was the first political leader to exploit Serbian
nationalism (Božić-Roberson, 2004, p. 396), but the fact that many of Milošević’s opponents
were themselves highly nationalist indicate there was a strong ethnic national identity available
over which different parties could contest.
Georgia’s Rose Revolution took place largely in December of 2003, when nonviolent
activists flooded the streets of Tbilisi, forcing then-President Eduard Shevardnadze to step down
in favor of Mikheil Saakashvili. Georgia certainly had its share of ethnic tensions, whether from
Ossetians, Abkhaz, or Ajaria, but one of the issues with the Rose Revolution is that it took place
when neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia were under the control of the central government.
While Ossetians and Abkhaz speak a different language, Ajarians share the main language to the
extent of speaking a dialect and using the same written form.
Overall Georgia presents somewhat of a mixed case in the argument for the necessity of a
unified national identity. While an overarching Georgian identity does exist, not everyone in
Georgian society subscribes to it. However, aside from the Abkhaz and the Ossetians, most
members of society could be said to have some measure of belonging to the central national
identity, making it potentially valuable for contestation at the time of the Rose Revolution.
The Orange Revolution in Ukraine took place against a background of struggle over the
country’s national identity. Ukrainian society was split between welcoming the influence of the
EU and the West or leaning back to Russia and the East. As Way stated, “divisions over national
identity…made it possible for the opposition to use national identity as a mobilizational weapon”
(2010, p. 130). President Kuchma, and his chosen successor, Yanukovych, represented the
“Russophile” national identity (Binnendijk & Marovic, 2006, p. 413). On the other hand,
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Yushchenko and the Pora student movement, supporting a “Ukrainian-centered” identity, stood
in opposition (p. 414).
A Ukraine-centered identity traces its roots to the Kyvian Rus period from 9th to 13th
centuries. Following the Russification of Ukraine during the Soviet period, a Ukrainian-centered
identity gained in strength and pushed the country toward more openness to the West and more
democratic forms of governance (Shulman, 2005). Taras Kuzio (2010) argued that this push by
the Western-oriented Ukrainophile identity—which he characterized as civic as opposed to
ethnic—is an important element in the success of the Orange Revolution. Polling data shows the
support for revolution and participation were dominated by western and central regions of
Ukraine, where the Ukrainophile identity held more sway (Kuzio, 2010, p. 293).
Arab Spring
For each of these countries that experienced an uprising viewed as a part of the Arab
Spring movement, there is the added element of attempting to distinguish between national or
ethnic identities, and religious and sectarian identities grounded in interpretations of Islam. These
can be difficult to untangle given the birth of Islam in this region and its dominant social role in
Muslim communities. Despite this difficulty, we shall briefly analyze the structural context of
several of these uprisings in order to determine the extent to which a unified national identity
existed and was available for mobilization by civil resistance organizations.
Egypt is a country that is characterized by a rich history of national identity, both Islamic
and pre-Islamic, which, as Suleiman argues, “promotes itself as an alternative to Arab and
Islamic nationalism” in the Egyptian cultural and political space (Suleiman, 2003, p. 169). The
creation of an Egyptian identity stems from a dialectical process of struggle against and
comparison with colonial occupiers, i.e., Britain, and the use of historical components of its
pharaonic, Islamic and Arabic pasts to construct a uniquely Egyptian identity. While many
Egyptians see themselves as Muslims and as part of the Arab world, they also view themselves
as somewhat unique due to their link to the great civilizations of Egypt’s past.
Bahrain, by contrast presents a far less unified picture with a large Arab population split
into Sunni Bahrainis and Shiites, South Asians, and other expatriates who make up 54 percent of
the population (Al Khalifa, 2011, p. 58). Al Khalifa, who served as the Bahraini Minister of
Culture, argued that as an island nation Bahrain has a multiplicity of identities from which to
draw, and this cosmopolitanism creates a set of shared beliefs, values, practices, and familiar
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circumstances which can, when applicable, express themselves in a Bahraini national identity.
However, despite this, she acknowledged the 2011 uprising coalesced around the sectarian
schism between Sunnis and Shiites. Hasan Shafaei of the Bahrain Human Rights Monitor
appeared to agree, arguing that although Islam should unify Bahrainis, the country is “very much
affected by sectarian tension” (Shafaei, n.d.). Therefore, there is a conspicuous absence of a
unifying national identity in Bahrain. Though Bahrain possesses all the prerequisites for
establishing a strong national identity, Bahrain’s national identity “is not sufficiently strong” in
the current political situation (Shafaei, n.d.). During the 2011 movement, in addition to the
demand for fair elections and a representative government, “civil resisters demanded an end to
the ‘political naturalization’ of Sunnis from other nations” (Nepstad, 2013, p. 343). About half of
Bahrain’s security forces are composed of Sunni immigrants from countries like Pakistan,
Yemen, Syria, and Jordan (Al-Shehabi, 2011). The Sunnis in the security forces, Nepstad (2013)
argued, had no incentive in defecting or changing the regime, which could lead to a Sunni purge
from the security forces. Hence, the armed forces remained loyal to the incumbent.
Finally, Libya presents a complicated picture of a state that attempted, at times, to
construct a national identity, but to most observers was not successful. For most of its history
Libya has been dominated by tribal identities, with some competition from Islamic identities and,
for a brief while, the incursion of Arab Nationalism based on the popularity of Egypt’s Nasser.
Prior to the ascent of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s King Idris was described as a “struggling”
monarch seeking to create a Libyan national identity from the various tribes that made up its
population at independence (Golino, 1970, p. 348). Both Golino and Anderson (1986) noted that
Idris continued the prior policies of promoting one ethnic group over the others, never quite
succeeding in convincing the entire country that a unified Libyan identity existed.
By contrast, Gaddafi’s 42-year rule focused first on an Islamic identity and his personal
role as the principal spokesman of political Islam. Anderson intimated that, as Gaddafi grew
more secure in power, he shifted his concerns from an Islamic identity toward a more
revolutionary identity, espoused in his Green Book (Anderson, 1986, p. 70). In this sense
Gaddafi sought to promote an “international identity” of revolutionary Islam and focused on a
cult of personality surrounding himself. He was fairly successful in doing so due to the weak
positions of Libyan national identity and Arab nationalism in the country (Anderson, 1986, p.
71).
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Overall, we see a mixed bag in terms of societies that either promulgated or harbored a
strong unified national identity. In some cases, like Northern Ireland, Bahrain and Libya, we see
societies whose primary division rested upon some form of ethnic, racial, or sectarian identity
(cf. Hancock, 2016; Jenkins, 1996). These societies could be said to conform to Horowitz’s
(2000) definition of stratified societies, where the primary division of identity is coterminous
with wealth and access to power. The other cases explored all possess some level of unified
national identity; we view this to mean ethnicity, race, or religion was not the basis for division
between those with the access to the levers of power and those without. As we move into our
next section, we will examine the extent to which national identity was a factor in the success or
failure of each of these nonviolent movements.
Attempts to Capture the Central Space
Now that we have established the existence of a coherent national identity in some of the
cases, we move on to examine the two questions we proposed earlier. First, does the existence of
a central national identity relate to the success of the movement? Second, in cases where the
national identity exists, did an attempt to “capture” that identity—by the civil resistance
movement or the incumbent—take place? Also, what were the effects of these attempts?
Our preliminary statement on central or core national identity does not plumb each case
in depth. However, it illuminates the relevance of collective identity in civil nonviolent attempts
at regime change; these initial inferences may support the contention that the existence of a core
or central national identity shared by elites and masses is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for success in nonviolent revolutions.
Table 1 below shows a general correlation between the existence of a shared national
identity and the success of the nonviolent civil resistance movement for each of the three time
periods. In addition to mass participation and subsequent security force defections, we have
observed that a strong common national identity plays a key role in nonviolent campaigns. In
cases exhibiting common national identity, there was a higher level of mass participation, and the
security forces were more likely to be swayed to support the movement or, withdraw their
support from the incumbent regime.
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Table 1
National Identity in Nonviolent Movements
National
Identity

Main Division

Outcome

Northern Ireland (1968)

Not Shared

Prot/Cath

Failure

Iran (1979)

Shared

None

Success

Philippines (1983)

Shared Core

None

Success

Serbia (2000)

Shared

None

Success

Georgia (2003)

Shared Core

Ethnic

Success

Ukraine (2004)

Weak Split

East/West

Success

Iran (Green) (2009)

Split?

Persian/Islamic

Failure

Egypt (2011)

Shared

None

Success

Bahrian (2011)

Split

Sunni/Shiite

Failure

Libya (2011)

None

Tribal

Failure

Early Cases

Color Revolutions

Arab Spring

In the Philippines, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, Iran, and Egypt, either a common national
identity existed, or as in the Philippines and Georgia, most of those involved in the
demonstrations shared an identity with the elites and were not contending over the centrality of
that identity. Furthermore, in each of these cases the population and the security forces shared
that central identity, making it possible for a bridge to be built between the movement and the
security forces.
On the other side of the ledger, it seems clear from this initial snapshot that Northern
Ireland, Bahrain, and Libya all lacked a central national identity shared by a majority of the
population and their elites, much less the security forces. In the case of Northern Ireland, while
an overarching British identity is quite strong, it is still not shared by the entire population of the
province. Instead, Northern Ireland has been characterized by its split into sectarian divisions of
Catholic and Protestant, affecting most aspects of communal relationships. From its creation in
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1922 to the outbreak of the Troubles, Northern Ireland was ruled by the Ulster Unionist Party
and controlled by upper class Protestants. The security forces—the Royal Ulster Constabulary
and its auxiliaries—were almost completely made up of Protestants, who also managed the
majority of the wealth and, thanks to a heavily gerrymandered electoral system, controlled most
of the local district councils (cf. Hancock, 1998, 2014a).
Likewise, both Bahrain and Libya failed to establish a central national identity.
Furthermore, the security forces of both states were (or are) controlled by members of the ruling
family, and often staffed by expatriates. In Bahrain’s case, this refers to the National Guard,
whose 2,000 member strong force was rapidly expanded by recruiting foreign nationals from
Pakistan, Syria, and other countries (Al-Shehabi, 2011; Imtiaz, 2011; Mashal, 2011; Riedel,
2011). In Libya, no cohesive national identity was developed, leaving tribal affiliation as the
strongest form of identity for many Libyans. Likewise, the security forces were divided along the
tribal lines. While a Libyan national army did exist, it was largely made of up conscripts who
were poorly armed and trained. In reality, Gaddafi relied upon a number of paramilitary forces to
support his rule, including the Revolutionary Guard Corps, made up of members of his own tribe
and a Pan-African Legion made up of mercenaries. As with Bahrain’s forces and Northern
Ireland’s Protestant police force, we expect that tribal forces and expatriate mercenaries would
have little sympathy with popular nonviolent movements. Since they would feel little, or no
sense of shared identity with the dissidents, their defections would be highly unlikely.
Like Chenoweth and Stephan, we noted the 1979 Islamic Revolution managed to
persuade members of the security forces to defect and end their support for the Shah. The Shah’s
legitimacy and hold on power was already weakening: he was perceived as “a puppet of the
West…whose values were regarded as corruptive of Iranian culture and traditions” (Sazegera &
Stephan, 2010, p. 186). The Shah also alienated the security forces when he blamed his
subordinates, especially his Prime Minister. Moreover, the nonviolent movement seems to have
appealed to the security forces through a narrative anchored in Iranian identity:
Proud soldiers who are ready to sacrifice yourself for your country and homeland, arise!
Suffer slavery and humiliation no longer! Renew yours bonds with the beloved people
and refuse to go on slaughtering your children and brothers for the sake of the whims of
this family of bandits! (Sazagera & Stephan, 2010, p. 197)
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Following our hypothesis, this reflects both the presence of a coherent national identity as
a structural element and active attempts to capture that identity in order to persuade the security
forces to defect. As we turn to the penultimate section, we will grapple with the question of
agency, and whether struggles took place to capture the national identity in each of these
successful revolutions.
Identity Contestation and Capture in Nonviolent Revolutions
The main difference for most of the aforementioned cases is the presence or absence of a
coherent national identity that helped create a bridge between the nonviolent movement and
members of the security forces. If we were merely following Way’s (2010) thesis, we would not
need any further evidence. However, identities at various levels, from personal to national, are
constructive in nature. Activation of national identity, and subsequent participation in nonviolent
movements, is responsive to the stimulus of structural conditions and the actions of agents. Iran
experienced its Islamic Revolution in 1979 as well as a failed attempt at nonviolent change in
2009. In the former case, the resistance benefited from existing Islamic networks and their
successful use of national identity (Bayat, 2013; Sazegara & Stephan, 2010). During the Green
Movement, nonviolent organizers were unable to successfully contest an Iranian national identity
that was divided between a hardline interpretation of Iranians as dutiful subjects and the youth
movement’s interpretation of Iranians as active citizens (Hancock & Raisi, 2014, p. 22).
Therefore, national identity as a structural condition alone is far from sufficient in predicting and
analyzing success of nonviolent movements.
Our basic premise is that there needs to be a marriage between the structural element of a
national identity and the agency of the nonviolent movement to persuade members of the
security forces to cross over and defect from the incumbent regime. In some sense, finding
evidence for this agency is a challenging task. That being admitted, we believe there is some
evidence that in the more successful campaigns, civil resistance groups attempted to create
connections with members of the security forces and to base those connections on shared senses
of identity, often revolving around national identity.
The Philippines
In the Philippines, one can see the power of the Catholic church in mobilizing different
sectors of society and in providing an organizing backbone to the nonviolent movement
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p 160; Nepstad, 2011, pp. 151-152). Chenoweth and Stephan
15

argued that the diversity of the movement is what gave it the ability to bridge the gap between
the people and the security forces. The inclusion of people from all walks of life meant the usual
argument, that protestors were communists, became irrelevant (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p.
165). One could also assert the larger Catholic identity enabled the people and the security forces
to cross the bridge. Chenoweth and Stephan further note that instead of attacking loyalist troops:
…supporters of Corazon Aquino offered them food and appealed to their sense of nationalism as
an encouragement to join the prodemocracy movement… (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 166).
Here, the defections of Juan Ponce Enrile, the Defense Minister, and Fidel Ramos, the deputy
chief of staff of the armed forces, were instrumental to the civil resistance (even though they had
been planning a coup that Marcos discovered). Civil resistance leaders like Cardinal Jaime Sin
chose to protect these men and their troops as patriots. This decision opened a bridge between
the security forces and civil resisters and made it far more difficult for loyalist troops to use
violence (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 118-19). When coupled with the outreach practiced toward loyalist
troops we can see some preliminary evidence the civil resistance movement deliberately acted to
secure a common identity with security forces, making it easier for them to defect and harder to
use violence against the protesters.
Serbia
The case of Otpor provides further compelling evidence of contestation of national
identity. In contrast to the divisive ethnonational mobilization of Serbian leaders, Otpor
employed national identity as a vehicle for change. “Resistance because I love Serbia,” for
instance, was one of the slogans employed during Otpor’s campaign (Nikolayenko, 2012, p. 39).
Otpor’s civil dissidents practiced outreach designed to sway the sympathies of the police and
army, explicitly telling them there was no conflict between the protesters and security forces. In
fact, Otpor “tried to establish a dialogue with the police by persuading law enforcement agents
that they were all victims of the political regime” (Nikolayenko, 2007, p. 178). This was done
through several mechanisms. The first was their strict adherence to nonviolence and polite
treatment of the police. Tina Rosenberg noted that “From the beginning, Otpor had treated the
police as allies-in-waiting. Otpor members delivered cookies and flowers to police stations
(sometimes with a TV camera in tow). Instead of howling at police during confrontations, Otpor
members would cheer them” (Rosenberg, 2011). Additionally, Otpor:
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…instructed people to carry roses, chant positive slogans, gather in their own
neighborhoods, and persuade policemen to change sides by reminding them their own
families could be among the protesters. It also gave practical advice on what
demonstrators should wear and carry to protect themselves from tear gas and police
batons. It suggested that they carry signs reading “Police and People Together
Against the Regime.” (Rosenberg, 2011)
Moreover, our colleague noted while conducting primary research into Otpor’s strategic
use of humor, that alongside the famous dilemma actions that focused on making the regime look
foolish, it conducted a number of positive actions. This included “pick a police” days, involving
“fraternizing marches” and “invasions” of police stations throughout Serbia, wherein:
Hundreds of female activists, including mothers with children brought cakes, cookies
and flowers to the police, who responded in a number of different ways. In Belgrade,
police blocked the front door of police stations so activists could not enter. However,
in Kragujevac and “many other cities,” police invited activists to enter and celebrate
with them, “sharing cakes and drinks, even singing with them!” (Lucas, 2010, pp.
105-106)
Lucas’ observation parallels Nikolayenko’s (2012) assertion that the nonviolent
movement in Serbia (and Georgia) balanced a negative campaign against the government with a
positive campaign to boost electoral turnout. Here, we can clearly identify agency in both action
and intent, designed to create a bridge with the security forces, in particular the police, and to
persuade them to defect by convincing them both they and the people were one, and both were
victims of the regime.
Georgia
The evidence of the opposition movement reaching out to the security forces in Georgia,
to get them to defect, is less clear. Trained by Otpor activists, Kmara employed similar
techniques of nonviolent resistance (Beissinger, 2009, p. 262). Kmara insisted on the application
of strict nonviolence strategies, such as the female activists passing out flowers to security
forces. In their attempt to “win” over the police, the activists used slogans like “Police is with the
people” to create a separation between the regime and the police (Nikolayenko, 2012, p. 46).
However, one participant argued it was the combination of nonviolence and large-scale
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participation in the demonstrations that convinced police to stand with the people and not with
the regime (Kandelaki, 2006, p. 11).
Despite the question of intent or agency, it is clear a connection was created between
security forces and the masses involved in nonviolent civil resistance. The police were reportedly
easy on the resisters; for instance, dissidents were released within seven hours of arrest
(Nikolayenko, 2012, p. 44). As Ó Beacháin (2009) noted, Shevardnadze himself did not want to
use force, but by the time he declared a state of emergency “he could not command the loyalty of
the security apparatus,” noting that police units “were defecting to the opposition in large
numbers” (p. 202). The question of whether this was by the design of the opposition movement,
or a result of their large numbers, is uncertain. However, there is a plethora of evidence that
dissidents established some connection with the security forces that benefitted the opposition.
Ukraine
There also seems to be evidence that the opposition movements in Ukraine attempted to
connect with elements of the security forces to persuade them to defect. Binnendijk and Marovic
(2006) indicated the nonviolent movement “worked extensively with families of current military
officers in garrison towns to build contacts and assess opinions” and, like their counterparts in
Serbia, the opposition movement capitalized on the sense that the military suffered from poor
living conditions, “emphasizing the relative deprivation and proposing measures to address” the
issue as a part of the presidential campaign (p. 417).
Following Otpor’s footsteps, Ukraine’s Pora movement sought to increase contacts with
police forces by leveraging arrests—where they could communicate the message of nonviolence
and their solidarity with police—and imitating the pick the police day actions by “visiting police
stations throughout Ukraine, giving policemen flowers and distributing letters…asking officers
to abide by the law” and not crack down on legal protests (Binnendijk & Marovic, 2006, p. 421).
Additional efforts were taken by opposition elites to calm potential police fears about civil
disturbances, informing police of planned demonstrations and offering to meet to discuss
methods and tactics. As Binnendijk and Marovic indicated, “[b]y the time of the Orange
Revolution…Kiev Mayor Oleksander Omelchenko offered the full cooperation of the Kiev
police” (p. 422).
Ukrainian national identity “was a force for autocratic consolidation in the years 19962002 … but was a force for authoritarian breakdown in 2002-4” (Way, 2010, p. 150). This, in
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our view, is an illustration of the constructive nature of identity, and how it can be re-framed and
mobilized by various contesting parties. In these nonviolent electoral movements, the
dictatorships pursued various strategies to defeat them. One of them was to paint the movements
as foreign agents, being funded by the West (Nikolayenko, 2012). The fact this strategy failed to
yield expected outcomes, shows that national identity was playing out in the movements’ favor.
Egypt
With regard to the Egyptian revolution, it appears that there was a sense of purpose and
agency in the movement’s outreach toward elements of the security forces. However, that
outreach was extended largely to the army as opposed to the much-maligned police force. In fact,
the beginning of mass protests in January 2011 was scheduled to take place on National Police
Day to rally against the abuses perpetrated by police and interior security forces. Despite this, it
is clear the April 6th youth movement, which was organizing the protests, had learned from
Otpor. When they were confronted by the police, they relied on their tactics of nonviolence,
eschewing violent resistance, saluting them, and at times embracing individual police members
(Jones, 2011, 7:20). During the marches one could see—as in Serbia, Ukraine, and elsewhere—
many symbols of the nation, most particularly the Egyptian flag. Also present was the military,
whose tanks were often covered with protesters, riding along with the soldiers and reaching out
to them in solidarity (Jones, 2011, 13:45). Later when the police withdrew from the streets,
protesters assisted the army to protect property from vandalism and looting. Direct quotes from
the April 6th movement indicate that they understood that they needed to reach out to the army
stating that “We need to be with the army, because we can’t separate the army from the people.
We have to be with the army” (Jones, 2011, 19:45). In fact, as noted in the Al Jazeera video, the
leader of the April 6th movement indicated that they had been in contact with military
representatives, but had decided to defer to higher level talks between official opposition groups
and the leading generals (Jones, 2011, 22:00).
At the time of the revolution, the military were viewed positively, as protectors of the
nation and as a professional body rather than a corrupt and abusive organization (Anderson,
2011). During the revolution, the army often appeared to act as a calming force, at times
protecting protesters from police violence and guarding national treasures while turning a blind
eye to the takeover of the interior ministry. The Egyptian military was conscript-driven, with
soldiers belonging mostly to the middle and lower classes (Nepstad, 2015). This helps explain
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why many soldiers joined the protests, and the cry of “The people and the army are one!” was
successful (Nepstad, 2015, p. 139). And as with many of our other successful cases, it was the
military defection from the regime that led to the removal of the incumbent. Only in the case of
Egypt, this removal was instigated by the military and resulted in the creation of a military-led
regime, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), to oversee a sham “transition to
democracy.”
However, there is a question, much as in the case of the Philippines, about the extent to
which the military’s shift in allegiance stemmed from an affinity with the people, and how much
it stemmed from an instrumental desire by the professional officer corps to retain control over
their massive economic empire. Military defection is more likely when the collapse of the regime
is imminent as security forces are forced to consider their future in the post-incumbent future
(Kou, 2000). The Egyptian army was reportedly worried if Gamal Mubarak succeeded his father,
it would lead to privatization policies and loss of U.S. funding (Nepstad, 2015, p. 139). In sum,
the military not only viewed the dissident movement as the more likely to emerge victorious, but
also supported the movement because they “believed that defectors would not be punished”
(Nepstad, 2013, p. 343).
A Partially Promising Beginning
National identity is one of many factors that can affect the success or failure of a
nonviolent movement. We have shown, as summarized in Table 1, presence of a coherent
national identity correlates with the success of old and recent nonviolent campaigns. In addition
to the organization and agency of nonviolent campaigns, contesting or building a common
national identity is a structural necessity for nonviolent movements. Despite the relative lack of
data in this preliminary paper, we believe we have shown enough to initiate a discussion on the
role of national identity in nonviolent movements. The difference between success and failure of
nonviolent movement is often determined by the defection or non-participation of the regime’s
pillar of support, i.e., security forces (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Nepstad, 2013, 2015). In the
successful nonviolent cases reviewed in this paper, civil resisters have employed identity-based
narratives and slogans to establish the movement’s credibility and appeal to the commonalities
existing between them and the security forces. In sum, to a nonviolent movement, a common
national identity can serve as both a structural challenge and a vehicle for agency (Hancock,
2014b).
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It is difficult to fully capture the extent of national identity as a structural condition in this
paper. The Arab Spring movements captured the world’s attention, thanks to the unexpected
beginning and diffusion. However, many of the Arab Spring cases have fallen back under
Islamic (or military) leadership even though their campaigns were non-Islamic in outlook and
demands (Bayat, 2013, p. 592). This trend is attributed to the pre-existing structure and power
base of the Islamic groups (Abdelrahman, 2013, p. 572), or the intimate military-society linkage
(Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 29). Perhaps it is an indication of limitation of national identity—as a
structural condition and agency—to deliver post-revolution or post-regime change. Chabot and
Sharifi, for instance, propose a cultural, economic, and political transformation-based pathway to
revolution (Chabot & Sharifi, 2013, p. 210). We acknowledge, therefore, both the benefits as
well as limits of national identity in nonviolent movements.
On the other hand, the question of national identity, both as structural condition and
especially agency, merits further examination. We hope future work can study how the
organizers of nonviolent movements have attempted to use national identity as a bridge to secure
the defection of regime security forces. Also, what made the difference between success and
failure of their nonviolent attempts? In our view, future exploration of national identity in
nonviolent movements can provide a meaningful context to agency-based nonviolence
scholarship. It can also invite a critical examination of the structural facet associated with
successful nonviolent movements.
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